中国金融雄心对世界的挑战

China has been industrious this year in laying the foundations for a Sino-centric financial system. Though the realisation of Beijing’s grand design remains uncertain and far off, the thrust of its strategy is clear. First, it aims to create a renminbi zone to balance the US dollar zone that has dominated the world’s financial system since the end of the second world war. This involves encouraging the use of renminbi as a reserve currency, a unit of settlement for trade and a store of value for investors in securities. Progress on all fronts has been marked. Issuance of offshore renminbi bonds, for instance, rose to a record Rmb451bn in the first nine months of the year, from Rmb376bn in all of 2013, Moody’s, the credit rating agency, said yesterday.

The second plank in Beijing’s plan involves setting up institutions to mirror the multilateral organisations that govern the global development agenda. A decision in July by the Brics group of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) to establish the New Development Bank and a contingent reserve arrangement creates alternatives to the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. In October, the inauguration of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, with the backing of 20 countries, set up a rival to the Asian Development Bank. Beijing is also moving ahead with a scheme to create the Development Bank of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation, a six-country Eurasian political, economic and military grouping.
These four institutions will add to the considerable financial firepower of the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China. The latter has in the space of two years doled out about $670bn in credit – eclipsing all of the loans, guarantees and insurance extended by the US ExIm Bank in the previous eight decades.
今年以来，中国一直在忙着为一个以中国为中心的金融体系奠定基础。虽然实现北京的宏伟设计仍然既不明朗又很遥远，但其战略的主旨是明确的。首先，它力求创建一个人民币区，以抗衡自第二次世界大战结束以来主导世界金融体系的美元区。这包括鼓励使用人民币作为一种储备货币、一种结算贸易的单位、一种证券投资者的价值储存手段。迄今各方面都取得了显著进展。例如，信用评级机构穆迪(Moody’s)昨日表示，今年头九个月离岸人民币债券发行总量增至创纪录的4510亿元人民币，高于2013年全年的3760亿元人民币。
北京总体计划中的第二支柱是，仿照目前主导全球发展议程的多边组织，推动设立与之对应的机构。7月，金砖集团国家（巴西、俄罗斯、印度、中国和南非）决定建立新开发银行(New Development Bank)和应急储备安排，由此创建了与世界银行(World Bank)和国际货币基金组织(IMF)相对应的机构。10月，亚洲基础设施投资银行（Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank，简称AIIF）在20个国家的支持下成立，由此产生了一个与亚洲开发银行(Asian Development Bank)分庭抗礼的对手。北京还在推进创建上海合作组织开发银行(Development Bank of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation)的计划；上合组织是一个由欧亚六个国家组成的政治、经济和军事集团。
这四个机构将使中国国家开发银行(China Development Bank)和中国进出口银行(Export-Import Bank of China)本已相当可观的财务火力如虎添翼。中国进出口银行在短短两年里发放了大约6700亿美元信贷——超过美国进出口银行(US ExIm Bank)在之前80年期间提供的贷款、担保和保险。
Facts such as this underline the credibility of China’s ambitions. But misgivings also abound, mainly because China’s domestic record on governance is compromised by endemic official corruption, institutionalised favouritism shown to state-owned companies over their private counterparts and a lack of transparency in financial dealings.
Some senior figures have expressed their reservations in diplomatic language. Takehiko Nakao, the ADB president, said that while he understood the AIIF he did not welcome it. But other commentators are more blunt. “We want an order based on law, not on crude power, which unfortunately is the case in China right now,” said Akio Takahara, a professor at the University of Tokyo.
此类事实印证了中国雄心的可信度。但疑虑也很多，主要是因为中国的国内治理记录被官场腐败、对国有企业的制度化偏袒、以及财务交易缺乏透明度留下污点。
一些资深人士用外交语言表达了自己的保留意见。亚行行长中尾武彦(Takehiko Nakao)表示，虽然他理解AIIF，但他不欢迎它。其他评论员的语气更加生硬。“我们要的是基于法律的秩序，而不是基于蛮横实力的秩序，不幸的是，后者正是中国现在的情况，”东京大学(University of Tokyo)教授高原明生(Akio Takahara)表示。
For its part, China argues that it is not trying to replace the existing financial order but to improve it. It cites estimates of an $8tn shortfall in funding for Asian infrastructure projects to emphasise the need for extra sources of funding beyond what can be provided by the World Bank, IMF, ADB and other existing multilateral organisations.
In addition, it is clear that the new institutions China is helping to establish have been born largely of frustration. The IMF in particular is disliked in much of the developing world, where its rigid adherence to market reforms is suspected of being an instrument to keep poor countries down, not lift them out of poverty.
Thus, existing multilateral organisations will have to change their spots to compete more effectively in an increasingly Sino-centric world. China, meanwhile, may find that, if it does not embrace transparent and exacting governance standards for these new financial institutions, they may wither before they build a reputation to match their funding power.

中国方面则辩称，它并不是要取代现有的金融秩序，而是要改善现有秩序。它以亚洲基建项目估计存在8万亿美元资金缺口为例，强调需要额外的资金来源，而不仅仅是依靠世行、IMF、亚行等现有多边组织。
此外，很明显的是，中国正推动建立的新机构的诞生在很大程度上源于失望。IMF尤其不受很多发展中国家的欢迎，该机构对市场化改革的刚性坚持，被怀疑是一种压制穷国（而不是帮助其脱贫）的工具。
因此，现有的多边机构将不得不对自己进行彻底整改，才能在一个日趋以中国为中心的世界更有效地开展竞争。与此同时，中国可能会发现，如果这些新的金融机构不实行透明、严格的治理标准，它们可能还没有建立起与自己的资金实力相称的声誉就已经走下坡路了。